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ii

ARGUMENT
I. Contract interpretation is determined from the plain meaning of
the contractual language. Richardson erroneously argues that all leaseoption agreements are created equal.
The main gist of Richardson's argument seems to be that his agreement
with Hart is a traditional lease with an option to purchase the property in
question. This argument ignores the main thrust of Hart's argument. Hart's
position from the inception of this case has been that her agreement with
Richardson was a "rent to own" agreement, quite different from a traditional
lease option agreement. Her agreement with Richardson differs not just in the
fact that a portion of her rent payments were to be applied to the purchase price.
It also differs substantially in the language used to set forth their agreement,
and in the phrasing of that language.
As pointed out in Hart's opening brief, the agreement is entitled
"RESIDENTIAL LEASE PURCHASE AGREEMENT". The parties are
referred to variously as "LandlordASe//er", Seller/Landlord",
"Owner's/landlord's", "Tenmt/Buyer" and "Buyer/Tenmt".

R. at 135-40.

The writing executed by the parties is repeatedly referred to as "this
1

agreement", the "agreement", "this contract", or "contract". If counsel's count is
correct, a form of this terminology is used 37 times in the agreement, while the
terms "lease", "rent", or "this lease" is used only 6 times. (The word "rent" is
used a number of additional times as a noun to describe part of the
consideration flowing from Hart to Richardson, but not in describing the
relationship between the parties. Nor does counsel's count take into account the
phrase "RESIDENTIAL LEASE PURCHASE AGREEMENT" across the top of
each page of the agreement, nor the phrase "lease purchase agreement" found in
three places in the body of the agreement.) R. at 135-40.
Richardson suggests that the title of the agreement set forth in bold type
across the top of each page should be given little or no effect. Brief for
Appellee at 12. Most well drafted agreements contain clauses reciting that
captions are for convenience only and do not affect the agreements
interpretation but the agreement in question does not contain such a clause. R.
at 135-40. While there is sparse authority as to the effect captions should have
on the interpretation of a contract in the absence of a caption clause, presumably
because most contracts do have a caption clause, courts do look to captions in
determining the intent of the parties. See Windsor Securities, Inc. V. Hartford
2

Life Insurance Co., 986 F.2d 655, 667 (3d Cir. 1992) (contract section
subheading evinces an intent of the parties to grant certain agency powers).
Further, M[I]t is axiomatic that a contract should be interpreted so as to
harmonize all of its provisions and all of its terms, which terms should be given
effect if it is possible to do so.'1 Gillmor v. Macey, 2005 UT App 351 f 19, 121
P.3d 57 (Utah Ct. App. 2005) (quoting LDS Hosp. v. Capitol Life Ins. Co., 765
P.2d 857, 858 (Utah 1988))
Richardson's reliance on cases that discuss rules applicable to holding
over after the fixed term of a traditional lease and option to purchase is
misplaced. This is not a traditional lease and option to purchase and it should
be interpreted by reference to the plain meaning of the particular wording of all
its parts, including its title. The only way the plain meaning of all its provisions
can be harmonized is to adopt the interpretation asserted by Hart.
II. This Court should not affirm the trial court's decision on other
grounds.
Richardson invites this Court to affirm the trial court's decision on
other grounds. Concededly this court has the power to affirm on other grounds
under proper circumstances as discussed by the court in the case cited by
3

Richardson. Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, 52 P.3d 1158 (Utah 2002).
However, this should only be done in limited circumstances and certainly not
when the appellate court must act as the fact finder:
As we have indicated above, an appellate court may affirm the
judgment appealed from if it is sustainable on any legal ground or
theory apparent on the record.... In the limited circumstance that
an appellate court chooses to affirm on an alternate ground, it may
do so only where the alternate ground is apparent on the record.
When an alternate theory is apparent on the record, the court of
appeals must then determine whether the facts as found by the trial
court are sufficient to sustain the decision of the trial court on the
alternate ground. The court of appeals is limited to the findings of
fact made by the trial court and may not find new facts or reweigh
the evidence in light of the new legal theory or alternate ground.
Id. at \20. The Utah Supreme Court has reiterated this rule as recently as last
month:
We may affirm a judgment on an unpreserved alternate ground
"where the alternate ground is apparent on the record" and when
"the facts as found by the trial court are sufficient to sustain the
decision of the trial court on the alternate ground." On appeal, we
are "limited to the findings of fact made by the trial court and may
not find new facts or reweigh the evidence in light of [a] new legal
theory or alternate ground."
Angel Investors, LLC v. Garrity, 2009 UT 32, | 3 8 (Utah 2009). (footnotes
omitted).
The trial court made no findings regarding the timeliness of Hart's
payments. Richardson seeks this court to make such findings, but he tacitly
4

admits this court does not have that prerogative: "To the extent this Court is
precluded from reviewing the undisputed portions of the record as a basis for
affirming the trial court on other grounds, the matter should be remanded to the
trial court for further findings and conclusions." Brief for Appellee at 14.
Even if the trial court had found that Hart was late on her payments, that
fact would be irrelevant because forfeiture provisions are not self-executing.
[T]he [forfeiture] provisions in the uniform real estate contract are
not self-executing, and to enforce them, it requires some
affirmative act on the part of the seller to notify the buyer of what
specific provision in the contract the seller is proceeding under and
state what the buyer must do to bring the contract current.
Commercial Inv. Corp. v. Siggard, 936 P.2d 1105, 1109 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).
In the contract in the instant case paragraphs 49 and 50 govern forfeitures.
Thus paragraph 49 provides: "Any failure . . . to pay rent on time .. . where
such a failure continues thirty (30) days after written notice thereof by
Landlord/Seller will constitute a material breach of his contract and forfeit the
option to purchase." No such notice was ever given by Richardson. R. at 70. He
did give Hart a 3 day notice to pay or quit. Three days later Hart paid the $5065
dollars that Richardson demanded and gave him notice of her intent to exercise
her option. Richardson immediately served her with a 30 day notice of
5

termination of her tenancy. R. at 45-46.
Richardson also invites this court to affirm the trial court on the alternate
grounds that Hart failed to tender payment when she attempted to exercise the
option. The trial court did make a finding that, "On July 29, 2005, for the first
time since the commencement of the Agreement, [Hart] attempted to exercise
the option by way of a letter to [Richardson] stating that she 'intends to exercise
the Option . . . ."f R. at 188. But the purpose of this finding was not to resolve
the factual and legal issue of whether Hart had made an effective tender. The
obvious purpose of this finding was to establish that the date of Hart's first
attempt to exercise the option was after the date on which the court erroneously
concluded that the option had expired:
However, even if she had [extended the lease term an additional 6
months], the 6 month extension would have expired on October 1,
2004 at the latest, yet [Hart] did not attempt to exercise the option
until July 29, 2005, ten months later. Time was of the essence in
the performance of the Agreement. As such, the Court concludes
that there was no option to exercise on July 29, 2005, inasmuch as
it had expired by that date.
R. at 189. This conclusion and the finding supporting it does not purport to
address the issue of effective exercise and tender.
There was substantial additional evidence and argument presented at trial
6

on the issue of effective tender. Richardson admitted that he only gave Hart the
two written notices discussed above. R. at 70. Neither fulfills the notice
requirements of paragraph 49 of the agreement. But even if the first notice (the
three day notice to pay or quit) was deemed sufficient, Hart had until August 26,
2005, to cure her defaults and exercise her option. Richardson admitted that by
August 26th he had been contacted by Hart's escrow closing company and told
that they had the purchase money and were prepared to close. R. at 222, p. 67.
So within the 30 day cure period, the default was cured, Richardson had full
notice of Hart's exercise and the purchase price was tendered.
Even if Hart had not made sufficient tender, tender was excused.
Tender is excused where it is plain and clear that a tender, if made,
would be an idle ceremony and of no avail.
Shields v. Harris, 934 P.2d 653, 655 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (quotation marks and
citations omitted). In this case, Richardson made it very clear that he
considered the option agreement to be of no effect and that he was not going to
sell. R. at 45-46 and R. at 246, tabs 5, 7 and 9.
This court should not accept Richardson's invitation to affirm on other
grounds.

7

III. The law abhors forfeitures.
Richardson argues that the agreement is not a Uniform Real Estate
Contract. He argues that the agreement is a lease with an option to purchase
and therefore the maxim that the law abhors forfeitures should not apply.
Richardsonfs argument is that Hart maintains that her agreement with him is
essentially a UREC. Brief for Appellee at 17-19. Richardson's argument is
essentially a straw man argument.
It is not Hart's position that her agreement with Richardson is a UREC.
She has only argued that the agreement has some of the attributes of a UREC
that are not typically included in a traditional lease with an option to purchase.
Hart's position is that the Residential Lease Purchase Agreement should be
interpreted by looking at the plain meaning of the contractual language,
attempting to harmonize all of the agreement's provisions and terms, and
applying other rules helpful in determining the parties' intent. Brief for
Appellant at 5-7; and this Brief supra at 2-3. One rule that is helpful in
determining the plain meaning is the maxim that the law abhors forfeitures.
This rule is not limited in its application to URECs, but has often been relied on
in that context. See Grow v. MarwickDev., Inc., 621 P.2d 1249, 1251 (Utah
8

1980) (forfeitures are not favored in the law, thus, in order to forfeit a
purchaser's interest under a uniform real estate contract, the seller must comply
strictly wit!i the notice provisions of the contract). Further, the "abhors
forfeitu

nil has been applied specifically to leases containing options to

purchase. Sec Kaufman fir*i/Aiyrv Construction Inc, v. Estate ofOlney, 29
Wash. App. 296, 299-300, 628 P.2d 8SK ( V\ • i

I < »X I).

Richardson argues that the parties' agreement is unlike a UREC because
Hart had no enforceable obligation to purchase. But it is not Richardson's
inability to enforce Hart's option to buy that is relevant. It is the fact that Hart's
investment ami option was terminated without Richardson complying with the
tern lii latioi 11 < sqi ill et i lei its of tl leir agreement.
Richardson * limine ;hes Hints investment ami interest in the property But
Hart had a significant sum of money invested by way o I her % } i 111 m o n I h I \
contribution to the purchase price and the additional $5065. Further, she had a
valuable property interest in the option to profit from a potential rise in market
values. Hart's investment and property interests should not be forfeited if any
reason, lb!*" J k u u t i \ i. inlei pretation of the agreement can be found. The
interpretation asserted I

Hart is a reason, h: alternative to the harsh one
9

adopted by the trial court.
IV. Hart is entitled to attorney fees.
Richardson argues that Hart is not entitled to attorney fees because she
never presented any evidence of attorney fees at trial. However, Hart was not
the prevailing party at trial, and a party does not waive their opportunity to
present evidence of attorney fees until a final written judgment is entered.
Meadowbrook Lie v. Flower, 959 P.2d 115, 117-20 (Utah 1998) (a prevailing
party that files a motion for attorney fees before signed entry of final judgment
or order does not waive its claim to such fees, unless otherwise provided by
statute or unless it fails to comply with the court's order to address the issue at a
specific time.) If this court should reverse the trial court and remand this case
for further proceedings, as Hart urges, then the trial court's final written
judgment is no longer extant, and Hart should be permitted to prove her
attorney fees if she is ultimately the prevailing party in the trial court.
CONCLUSION
The district court's interpretation flies in the face of the plain language of
the agreement. This result is underscored by application of the maxim that the
law abhors forfeitures. This court should overturn the district court's decision,
10

remand the matter to the district court, and award Hart her attorney fees.
DATED this _ 2 0 d a y of July, 2009.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL
I hereby certify that on this/22_ day of July, 2009,1 served a 2 copies of
the foregoing Brief on the attorney for Appellee by mailing two copies of the
same by first class mail addressed to Stephen F. Noel at 4723 Harrison Blvd.,
Suite 200, Ogden, Utah 84403.
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Frank S. Warner
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